There is very limited evidence on the effects of the minimum wage in developing countries, and none whatsoever on the effects of the minimum wage on the public sector. Most of the evidence available uses (US) private sector data. However, evidence regarding the private sector need not carry over to the public sector. This paper estimates minimum wage effects across sectors using an under-explored monthly Brazilian household survey from 1982 to 2000. The minimum wage was found to compress the wage distribution of both sectors. However, consistent with a stronger compression effect, more adverse long run employment effects are observed in the private sector.
Introduction
The evidence in the international literature shows that the minimum wage compresses the wage distribution, although evidence of negative employment effects (Neumark and Wascher, 1992 and Williams, 1993; Burkhauser et al., 2000) , as predicted by the standard theory, has been challenged by evidence of non-negative effects (Card and Krueger, 1995 This evidence uses either private sector or overall (private and public sector) data. There is no available evidence in the literature on the effects of the minimum wage on the public sector. However, evidence regarding the private sector need not carry over to the public sector. The wage and employment effects predicted by the standard theory rely on a profit maximising firm, not on a Government employer that can cover the higher wage bill by raising taxes, reducing expenditure, or simply printing money, as is often the case in developing countries. If the public sector has an inelastic labour demand, the associated non-negative (or less negative) employment effect might offset some of the negative employment effect observed in the private sector, diluting the overall employment effect to be less adverse than the later. This is particularly so if the public sector is overpopulated by minimum wage workers, as in Brazil, where 15% of the labour force are civil servants and 7% of those earn a minimum wage. Taking the overall employment effect as an estimate of the effect on the private sector might mislead policymakers to increase the minimum wage more generously than they would otherwise do.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper to the literature and to policymaking is to fulfil the gap on evidence on the effect of the minimum wage across the private and public sectors. The effect of the minimum wage throughout the wage distribution is estimated for each sector, and the total employment effect in each sector is decomposed into hours and jobs effects. Another contribution of this paper is to use an under-explored monthly Brazilian household survey from 1982 to 2000. As the non-US literature is scanty, this will extend the current understanding on the effects of the minimum wage in developing countries. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, Sections 3 and 4 estimate wages and employment effects, and Section 5 concludes. The minimum wage was found to compress the wage distribution of both sectors. In the private sector, consistent with a stronger compression effect, more adverse long run total employment effects were observed.
In the public sector, no evidence of adverse employment effects was uncovered, suggesting an inelastic labour demand curve.
Data
The data is the Monthly Employment Survey, a rotating panel data similar to the US Current Population Survey, together with the Consumer Price Index. This data is available for six Brazilian metropolitan regions between 1982 and 2000, and it was aggregated across regions and across months; each cell had 13.000 observations on average. Figure 1 .a shows the log real minimum wage over time. The negative trend over time is due to persistent under-indexation of the nominal minimum wage according to the rules of successive stabilization plans. 1 The saw-toothed pattern over time is due to the quick erosion of large and frequent nominal minimum wage increases by the subsequent inflation. 1 The minimum wage does not vary across regions, gender or age. Its coverage is full, but accommodation and food costs can be deducted from the wage. That might account for some below minimum wage workers, although the majority of those are informal sector workers. Notice the proportion of below minimum wage workers working in the public sector in Figure 2 .b (between 12% and 21% in a poor region, and between 9% and 13% in the aggregate), where presumably there is full compliance with the minimum wage legislation. Figure 1 shows the 25 th , 50 th and 75 th percentiles of the log real earnings distribution both for the private and public sectors over time. The trend is negative for all percentiles.
The correlations with the log real minimum wage (on the top of each figure) suggest that these correlations are stronger for the private sector. The correlation with the 25 th (75 th ) percentile is 0.86 (0.75) in the private sector, and 0.66 (0.46) in the public sector. Figure 2 shows the Kernel log real earnings distribution for each month of 1992 for both sectors before and after each minimum wage increase. The two main features in these distributions are the spike at the minimum wage and the compression effect observed in both sectors. First, the spike is larger in the private sector. On average over the sample period, the spike (i.e. the fraction of workers earning ±1.02 times the minimum wage) is 11% (7%) in the private (public) sector. Nonetheless, the spike shows great variation over the sample period, for example, it jumped from 2.5% to 14.5% (1.5% to 9%) in the private (public) sector in response to the September of 1991 increase. This is large when compared to the 4% spike in the US in 1993 (Dolado et al., 1996) . Second, in line with a more binding minimum wage and a larger spike in the private sector, the compression effect is stronger in that sector. Figures titled April-May, August-September and December-January show the compression effect (see the right-most distribution) after the increase. Figure 3 shows three employment variables for both the private and public sectors over time: log total average hours worked in the working population, log average hours worked for those working and log employment rate. All three variables show a slightly negative (positive) and significant (not significant) trend for the private (public) sector over time.
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The correlations with the log real minimum wage (on the top of each figure) suggest that these correlations are once again stronger for the private sector. The correlations between each of the three variables and the log real minimum wage are 0.41, 0.38 and 0.19 (-0.09, -0.12 and -0.01) in the private (public) sector.
Wage Effects
The wage effects are estimated using a standard model in the literature (Brown, 1999) :
where W rt is real hourly average wages; MW t is real hourly minimum wage; 3 π rt−1 is past inflation; u rt−1 is past unemployment rate; X rt are labour supply shifters; f Regional dummies model region specific trends because regions are expected to differ not only in their business cycles but also in the pace of the cycle. Supply shifters are the population proportion: of youngsters, children younger than 10 years old, women, illiterate, retiree and student; in urban areas, working in the informal sector, in the public sector, in the building construction and in the metallurgic industry; working on two jobs; with basic and high school education and the average number of years of education. (Dickens et al., 1999) . The models were sample size weighted, White-corrected for heteroskedasticity and corrected for serial correlation across and within regions (assuming an autoregressive process specific to each region).
The real minimum wage, together with the "Kaitz index" (defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage adjusted for coverage of the legislation), are the typical minimum wage variables used in the literature. Although both variables vary across regions and over time, when the minimum wage is constant across regions, the variation in the ratio is driven by the variation in the denominator. As a result, the effect of the inverse of the deflator (or average wages) on wages is what is ultimately estimated (Welch and Cunningham, 1978) . Although a constant minimum wage presents a difficulty in estimation, Card (1992) exploited this to suggest a new minimum wage variable, "fraction affected", defined as the proportion of workers earning a nominal wage between the old and the new nominal minimum wage. The intuition is that a constant minimum wage affects a different proportion of workers depending on the initial level and the shape of the wage distribution across regions.
Brown (1999) compares "fraction affected" and the "Kaitz index" and concludes that the former is conceptually cleaner because it measures the effect of the minimum wage at the point that really matters. Nonetheless, "fraction affected" is constant at zero when the nominal minimum wage is constant and does not capture its erosion in relation to other wages. In order to capture this erosion, "fraction affected" is here defined as the proportion of workers earning a real hourly wage between (-1.02 times) the old and (+1.02 times) the new real hourly minimum wage. Thus, to ensure identification, the difference of log hourly minimum wage in Equation (1) is replaced by "fraction affected". The "fraction affected" estimates are then multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the "fraction affected" with respect to the real minimum wage. 4 Card and Krueger (1995) interpret their "fraction affected" estimates in a similar way. (3.63%) in the private (public) sector. This suggests that the minimum wage compresses the wage distribution of both sectors, but that the compression effect extends higher in the private sector. This is in line with the evidence discussed in Section 2 that shows that the minimum wage is more binding and that the spike is larger in the private sector wage distribution (see Figure 2 ). This is also in line with previous empirical evidence on the (overall) wage effect across the distribution in the international and Brazilian literature (see Section 1).
Employment Effects
The employment effects are estimated using a standard model in the literature (Brown, 1999) :
where N rt means, in turn, average hours in the population ( T rt ), average hours for those working ( H rt ) and the employment rate ( E rt ); f n r and f n t are region and time fixed effects modelled as before, and n rt is the error term. As the employment response to minimum wage increases might be lagged, dynamics are allowed:
Estimating Equations (2) and (2') separately using each of the three employment variables ( T , H and E), the estimate of the real minimum wage in the T equation equals the sum of the estimates of the real minimum wage in the Hand E equations, i.e.
This makes it possible to decompose the total effect of a minimum wage increase on employment into hours and jobs effects. As in Section 3, to ensure identification, the difference of log hourly minimum wage in Equations (2) and (2') is replaced by "fraction affected", whose estimates are multiplied by 4.5. Also, the models were again sample size weighted, White-corrected, and corrected for serial correlation. Estimates for the dynamic model in column 2 shows that a 10% increase in the real minimum wage increases (decreases) total employment by 0.09% (0.31%) in the private (public) sector, decomposed into a 0.10% (0.32%) increase (decrease) in the number of hours worked and a 0.01% (0.01%) decrease (increase) in the number of jobs. After two years of adjustments, total employment decreases (increases) by 0.06% (0.66%). Nonetheless, only the long run estimates are significant. This suggests that the minimum wage does not effect employment in the short run in either sector. In the long run, the minimum wage decreases employment in the private sector, mainly via a decrease in the number of hours worked. In the public sector, even in the long run, no evidence of adverse employment effect was uncovered, suggesting an inelastic labour demand curve.
Thus, despite of sizeable wage effects in both sectors, adverse employment effects are small. They are also small when compared to the -1% (overall) employment effect in the international literature, but in line with previous (overall) employment effect evidence for This is because theory predicts a stronger effect on population groups where the minimum wage is more binding. In that sense, evidence of a stronger compression effect and more adverse employment effects in the private sector is consistent with theory.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of the minimum wage on wages and employment in the private and public sectors in Brazil. The minimum wage was found to compress the wage distribution of both sectors. In the private sector, consistent with the presence of a larger spike, larger spillover effects, and a stronger compression effect, more adverse long run total employment effects were also observed. In the public sector, no evidence of adverse employment effects was uncovered, suggesting an inelastic labour demand curve. This is supporting evidence that a Government employer does not respond to a minimum wage increase in the same way that a profit maximising firm does.
The evidence in this paper suggests that the associated non-negative employment effect 10 in the public sector offsets some of the negative employment effect observed in the private sector, diluting the overall employment effect to be less adverse than the later. Taking the overall employment effect as an estimate of the effect on the private sector might mislead policymakers to increase the minimum wage more generously than they would otherwise do.
More generally, the policymaking significance of these findings is that policymakers can use minimum wage laws to fight poverty and inequality without destroying too many jobs in Brazil. Nonetheless, such laws will increase the public deficit -uncontrollably large and growing in Brazil, as it is often the case in developing countries -which might undermine the fight against poverty and inequality. Incidentally, studying the effect of the minimum wage on the public deficit (via benefits, pensions, and the wage bill) might be a fruitful avenue for research.
[9] DOLADO, J., and ET AL. (a) Panels A and B show respectively GLS estimates (coef) of "fraction affected" for the private and public sectors, where the weights are the square root of the inverse of the sample size. Standard errors (se) are White-corrected and serial correlation corrected across and within regions (assuming an autoregressive process specific to each region) (b) The dependent variable is, in turn, various percentiles, ratios of percentiles and standard deviation of the wages distribution. (c) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modeled with region dummies, and labor supply shifter are included as controls. (d) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the estimates and standard errors were multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to "fraction affected". (a) Panels A and B show respectively GLS estimates (coef) of the "fraction affected" for the private and public sectors where the weights are the square root of the inverse of the sample size. Standard errors (se) are White-corrected and serial correlation corrected across and within regions (assuming an autoregressive process specific to each region) (b) Column 1 shows the base specification with past inflation, controls, region and time fixed effects; and column 2 adds dynamics to the base specification (24 lags of the independent variable). Column 3 shows the long run coefficient associated to the short run coefficient in column 2. (c) The dependent variable is, in turn, average hours worked for the labor force, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate. Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity. (d) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modeled with region dummies, and labor supply shifters are included as control (e) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the estimates and standard errors were multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to "fraction affected". Younger than 10 years old -Proportion of the population younger than 10 years of age, calculated using the reported date of birth at the time of the interview.
Illiterate -Proportion of the population self-reported as "not knowing how to read and write".
Retiree -Proportion of the population self-reported as retired.
Student -Proportion of the population self-reported as students.
In urban areas -Proportion of the population with addresses in urban areas.
Working in the public sector -Proportion of the population self-reported as working as civil servants on municipal, state or federal employment.
Working in the informal sector -Proportion of the population self-reported as working without a signed labour contract card.
Working in the building construction industry -Proportion of the population selfreported as working in the building construction industry.
Working in the metallurgic industry -Proportion of the population self-reported as working in the metallurgic industry.
Basic education degree holders -Proportion of the population self-reported with 8 years of formal education.
High school degree holders -Proportion of the population self-reported with 11 years of formal education.
Working on two jobs -Proportion of the population self-reported with a second job.
B. Elasticity of "Fraction at" with respect to the Nominal Minimum Wage
To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the "fraction at" estimates are multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the "fraction affected" with respect to the real minimum wage. The 4.5 estimate is the coefficient of the real minimum wage on a regression of "fraction affected" on the difference of log real minimum wage and the other regressors in Equation (1). This estimate was robust to using the regressors in Equations (2) and (2') instead. The intuition is given by a deterministic model where Table C .2 shows the full regression output for Equation (2') where N rt is defined as average hours in the population (corresponding to row 1, column 2, panel A of Table 2 ). The minimum wage variable is "fraction affected" (c) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modelled with region dummies, and labour supply shifters are included as controls. (d) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the "fraction affected" estimate needs to be multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to "fraction affected" Standard errors (se) are White-corrected and serial correlation corrected across and within regions (assuming an autoregressive process specific to each region). (b) The dependent variable is average hours worked for the labour force, which is one example of the employment equation estimated in the paper. The model is in differences. The minimum wage variable is "fraction affected" (c) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modelled with region dummies, and labour supply shifters are included as controls. (d) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the "fraction affected" estimate needs to be multiplied by 4.5, which is the approximate elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to "fraction affected"
C.2 Employment Effect

